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§1 A Guide to Guidance 
 
Appearances, demonstratives, facts, knowledge, name tags, 
people, perceptions, pictures (misleading or not), quotation marks, 
                                                            
1 Versions of the material in this paper were presented most recently in 
Liège (2018 “On Being Guided: Bühler in the Brown Book” and in 
Vienna (2013). I am grateful to the audiences for their comments. 
Thanks, too, to Peter Simons for help with engineering terminology.
  
 
rules, street signs, traffic signals, utterances, written signs, and many, 
many other things guide, lead, steer, control and influence us. In the 
writings of Brentano’s heirs and Wittgenstein, we find many verbs for 
such relations: 
 
trigger/auslösen 
follow/befolgen 
steer, control/steuern 
influence/beinflussen 
guide, lead/führen 
allow oneself to be led by/sich leiten lassen 
indicate/anzeigen 
 
The philosophers of guidance are Martinak, Marty and Ahlman, 
Husserl and Scheler, Bühler and Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein and his 
great predecessor, Bühler, sometimes use the term “signal” (Signal) 
for the first term of the relation of guidance2. “Understanding”, says 
Wittgenstein, “is like knowing how to go on, and so it is an ability: but 
´I understand`, like ´I can go on`, is an utterance, a signal (Signal).3 
Bühler systematically opposes signals to indicators (Anzeichen), 
sometimes called “utterances” (Äusserung) and expressions 
(Ausdruck), and also to symbols (Symbol). Signals guide or steer 
(leiten, steuern), symbols represent (darstellen) objects and states of 
affairs and indicators indicate (anzeigen) or express mental or 
psychological states, functions and acts. 
  
 One of the more striking illustrations of guidance or steering in 
Wittgenstein’s writings is to be found in the series of simple 
interactions described at the beginning of Philosophical 
Investigations, for example that of the builder who calls out a word 
and the assistant who then brings a stone. This is, among other things, 
an example of a use of language to “influence other people”.4 But, as 
Bühler had pointed out in 1927, the real variety of guidance only 
                                                            
2 Scheler and Bühler also use the expression “Signalement” 
3 Wittgenstein 1980 I §875. 
4 Wittgenstein 1980 §491. 
emerges if we consider both non-verbal and verbal interactions and 
their relations: 
 
The apprentice who hands something to his master in the course 
of carrying out some common task, the surgical assistant and the 
surgeon – here the fact that the activities go hand in hand is 
brought about by a steering directed towards a goal in a shared 
perceptual field…But if the focus of a desired steering 
transcends in any way the shared perceptual domain then….a 
higher-order contact is needed to make steering possible. If we 
take the case of contact of the highest possible kind, the speaker 
appeals to the ideas (Vorstellungen) and concepts of her listener. 
But before this there lies a range of intermediate steps and a 
labyrinth of ways of transcending [the shared perceptual domain] 
and of possibilities of overcoming this range.5  
What exactly is it to be guided by something? What are the main 
forms the phenomenon takes? What are the phenomena which 
presuppose, which are founded on guidance?  
 
The first question raises many other questions. Does guidance 
involve any sort of experience or is the notion a non-experiential one? 
Is it a passive or active phenomenon? Is it sometimes, if we allow 
ourselves some Husserlian jargon, a matter of passive activity and 
sometimes a matter of active passivity, and sometimes even a matter 
of passive passivity? Is the relation a causal relation? An example of 
association? Of motivation? Are the items which guide us reasons? 
What is the relation between guidance in the animal world and in the 
human world? Are expressions such as “guide” “lead” and “steer” 
family resemblance terms? Is the concept of guidance definable? 
 
One answer to the second question is that what we say and do 
influences the doxastic, epistemic, affective and conative states of 
others as well as their behaviour. But we are guided, too, by inanimate 
                                                            
5 Bühler 1929 40-41, cf. 90 
 
items - rules, norms, knowledge and by forms, the so called subjective 
apriori. Is this great variety exhibited by guidance a reason for 
thinking that it has no essence or nature? 
 
What sort of things presuppose, are founded on the phenomenon 
of guidance? Many if not all forms of social interaction. Consider for 
example the social category of a community (Gemeinschaft). Bühler 
suggests that there can be no community without reciprocal guidance: 
 
In human life there are many different accidental gatherings of 
hermits; we exclude them from the concept of genuine 
community life…It is enough for our purposes if we emphasize 
one feature, the fact that the meaningful behaviour of the 
members of a community is subject to reciprocal steering…6 
Indeed psychological contact, knowledge or understanding of the 
minds or souls of others involves reciprocal steering.7 
 Reciprocal steering of one individual by another is by no 
means the only type of social cement. Rule-following, in particular 
our blindly following rules, syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, moral, 
aesthetic, prudential, culinary, as well as the rules of etiquette and for 
driving on the left, is also important. We are guided by or, as Husserl 
puts it, allow ourselves to be guides by rules. Is following the same 
rules prior to belonging to the same community? Does the priority run 
in the other direction? Or is there perhaps no such relation of priority? 
In 1926, Ahlman endorses the first answer: 
We determine whether two individuals belong to the same 
linguistic community by finding out whether they observe the 
same norms and not vice versa - the norm system has priority 
over the linguistic community.8 
                                                            
6 Bühler 1929 39; in 1931 Charlotte Bühler and Lazarsfeld add: “The 
fact of reciprocal steering must be the constitutive element of social 
psychology” (Bühler & Lazarsfeld 1931 335). 
7 Bühler 1929 83-5, 99-101. 
8 Ahlman 1926 15. 
 
 A third type of social cement resembles the first in linking only 
individuals but differs from it in not involving reciprocal guidance. 
Exemplars or models, such as teachers, heroines and indeed popular 
musicians, guide or influence us. So, too, do counter-models. (“I don’t 
want to turn into that sort of person!”) Models are not leaders, as 
Scheler points out. Models and counter-models, unlike leaders, may 
be real or fictive. Leaders lead by telling us what to do, unlike models. 
Just as following a rule resembles but is not the same thing as obeying 
an order, so too, following an exemplar or model is like but is not the 
same thing as obeying the order of a leader. 
 The philosophy of guidance, then, is inseparable from social 
philosophy, the philosophy of perception and the philosophy of 
language. In what follows, I first look at the discussions of reading as 
an example of being guided (§2) by Bühler and Wittgenstein, the view 
that “guide” is a family resemblance term and the view that the 
concept of guidance is what Bühler called a “synchytic concept”, a 
concept which groups objects “according to a manifold similarity, that 
is, one that is not determined on the basis of only one aspect”.9 I then 
set out the different views of Bühler and Wittgenstein about an 
analogy between a person’s being guided by something and a 
machine’s being controlled by something and between the 
corresponding possibilities (§3). In the final section, I look at the 
relations between the views of early Bühler and early Wittgenstein on 
rule-awareness (§4).  
 The central aim of the paper is to show that some aspects of the 
thought of the later Wittgenstein amount to a very radical version of 
part of the philosophies of some of Brentano’s heirs. Brentano’s heirs, 
as is now well-known (perhaps even in the field of the history of 
                                                            
9 Bühler 1982 222. Bühler 1982 is referred to henceforth in the text as: 
ST. 
 
 
analytic philosophy) moved along two very different paths. Husserl 
and Meinong, Reinach and Scheler multiplied entities, modalities and 
essentialisms and set out thoroughly anti-naturalist and anti-pragmatist 
views. Marty, on the other hand, argued that much of the 
multiplication was unnecessary. He developed a very thorough 
account of meaning-nominalism, in which the functions of expressing 
mental states and modifying the mental states of interlocutors are 
prominent, an account embedded in an understanding of language and 
other social phenomena as the product of complicated, unplanned 
processes of selection. Husserl and many others, on this account, were 
tempted by linguistic pictures, succumbed to the temptations and from 
then on misled by just these pictures. This, Marty argues, is 
particularly true of Husserl’s 1900-01 dream of founding the 
philosophies of language and logic and so of many parts of philosophy 
on the theory of sense, nonsense and “logical grammar”. Marty’s 
philosophy is in some respects a Helvetic compromise between the 
view of the multipliers and the views of (late) Brentano himself, an 
uncompromising form of nominalism combined with the conviction 
that all philosophers of a different mind must be misled by linguistic 
fictions. Marty’s philosophy of language was developed above all by 
Bühler, Ahlman and Landgrebe and anticipated by Martinak.  
 In spite of their divergences, Brentano and his most famous 
heirs all took seriously the idea of philosophy as a theoretical 
enterprise. From the point of view of the development of Austro-
German philosophy, Wittgenstein’s most original innovations were 
two in number. First, the claim that the project of philosophy as a 
theoretical enterprise is taken seriously only by those who are in the 
grip of misleading pictures. Second, the suggestion that what look like 
essential, non-contingent philosophical claims, in particular claims 
made by Brentano’s heirs, are at best reminders about how words 
ought to be used.   
 The discussions of guidance by Bühler and Wittgenstein, as we 
shall now see, illustrate some aspects of this large picture. 
 
§2 Reading & Guidance 
 Two claims are central in the descriptions of guidance and of 
reading given by Bühler and then Wittgenstein. First, the 
extraordinary variety of these phenomena. Second, their independence 
of particular experiences and sensations. 
 Husserl often describes and analyses the phenomenon of 
reading. In his 1900-01 Logical Investigations he uses the 
phenomenon in order to consider the relation between visual 
perception and “intellectual” acts such as judging, supposing and 
meaning that p and to argue that there is nothing sensory about the 
latter. His conclusion influenced the Würzburg school of psychology, 
to which Bühler belonged. In their descriptions of reading as being 
guided, Bühler and Wittgenstein begin by setting aside what Husserl 
called intellectual acts:  
[H]ow do things stand in the case of optical linguistic 
symbols…? In fluent reading, our eyes wander jerkily over the 
lines taking in one word-image after another. Of course, the 
thoughts, emotions and interests of the reader do not remain with 
the black forms which stand on the white background of the 
paper but with the objects being dealt with…As far as the 
process (Geschehen) [of reading] is concerned, one can say that 
the sensory impressions intervene (eingreifen), triggering and 
steering. If I read a book out loud, the choice of tempo, whether I 
read loudly or softly, the right intonation, whether I read 
phlegmatically or in a lively way, this is up to me....And if we 
want to characterise briefly the intervention (Eingreifen) of 
optical perceptions in these activities, there are probably no 
better terms than triggering and steering10 
And when Wittgenstein invites us to “study the use of the expression 
´to be guided` by studying the use of the word ´reading`” he tells us 
that by the latter he means  
                                                            
10 Bühler 1929 75. 
the activity of translating script into sounds, also of writing 
according to dictation or of copying in writing a page of print, 
and suchlike; reading in this sense does not involve any such 
thing as understanding what you read.11  
In the Blue Book, we are told that “guided” is used in many different 
senses.12 There is, Wittgenstein also says, a “family of cases of 
deriving” sound from text and 
in the same way we also use the word "to read" for a family of 
cases. And in different circumstances we apply different 
criteria13 for a person's reading.14 
                                                            
11 Wittgenstein 1972 Brown Book §66 119. 
12 Wittgenstein 1972 41. 
13 In 1909 Bühler attributes to Paulhan what he takes to be the correct 
idea of using as “an objective criterion of understanding a correct 
reaction to perception of language” (Bühler 1909 115). He continues 
to use the term “criteria”, sometimes, like early Wittgenstein, as a 
synonym of “symptom”, sometimes sharply distinguishing the two. 
Bühler’s fullest account of the nature of criteria (Bühler 1930 367-
377) identifies criteria with reasons or justifications for that for which 
the criteria are criteria, for example the certainty of memory. He 
sharply distinguishes the relation of justification and causal relations. 
But, like Husserl, he also talks of an experience of the relation of 
justification, of noticing the relation between certainty and the criteria 
is based on, an idea Wittgenstein will criticise. Elsewhere Bühler uses 
“criteria” simply to mean conditions for being F. On criteria and 
symptoms and related notions in Bühler, Wittgenstein and Husserl, cf 
Mulligan 1990. 
 
 
14 Wittgenstein 1968 §164. 
In the following passage, Wittgenstein arrives at the conclusion that 
no one feature is essential to all cases of reading after mentioning only 
a handful of the numerous examples of types of reading he gives 
elsewhere: 
…our eye glides (gleitet) over printed lines differently from the 
way it glides over arbitrary pothooks and flourishes. (I am not 
speaking here of what can be established by observing the 
movement of the eyes of a reader.) The eye glides, one would 
like to say, with particular ease, without being held up; and yet it 
doesn't skid (rutscht). And at the same time involuntary speech 
goes on in the imagination. That is how it is when I read German 
and other languages, printed or written, and in various styles.—
But what in all this is essential to reading as such? Not any one 
feature that occurs in all cases of reading. (Compare the process 
(Vorgang) in the case of reading ordinary print with reading 
words which are printed entirely in capital letters, as solutions of 
puzzles sometimes are. What a different process it is!—Or 
reading our script from right to left.)15 
 
Steering, Bühler asserts in 1929, “can be described without 
referring to any “mental processes”16.  But when he asserts that “the 
entire domain of perception can be dealt with theoretically with the 
help of…three functions, signals, indicators and symbols” he also 
asserts that triggering and steering apply not only to “the aspect of 
behaviour” but also to “the aspect of experience”. Steering “describes 
the process (Geschehen) [of perception] from the lowest animals to 
the most complicated perceptions of symbols”.17 Although Bühler 
insists on the variety of guidance, he does not describe anything like 
the variety of cases distinguished and discussed by Wittgenstein. He is 
particularly interested in the variety of perceptual guidance:  
                                                            
15 Wittgenstein 1968 §168, translation modified. 
 
16 Bühler 1929 42. The concept of “reciprocal steering”, according to 
Charlotte Bühler, is a concept which “in principle already transcends 
introspection” (Bühler & Lazarsfeld 1931 335).  
17 Bühler 1929 75. 
   
Someone who reads in the ordinary way and remains with the 
content of his thoughts does not behave with respect to sense-
impressions in the same ways as someone who makes an 
“observation”. The visual impressions of the reader are only 
there in order to excite certain ideas, thoughts and feelings etc.. 
They are not noticed and considered in order to find out what it 
is that is seen and how it is. This is always the case when signs 
and indicators carry out their specific function. In the case of 
observations, it is quite different…Not all perceptions are 
observations; this is clearly shown by the example of ordinary 
reading. It is also shown by other examples: to consider an 
object within the aesthetic set (Einstellung, attitude) is to be 
oriented towards enjoyment…There are as many kinds of 
perception as there are specific aims of perception; arriving at a 
perceptual judgment is only one such aim.18 
 
He also distinguishes many different kinds of signals. Indexical 
expressions (Zeigwörter) are both signals and symbols (ST 90, 190). 
There are reception signals, action signals, position signals and 
individual signals. “That” and “I” are reception signals when they 
trigger eye-movements and so a reception and thus differ from action 
signals, such as imperatives (ST 107). “Here” is a position signal, “I” 
an individual signal (ST 95). Anaphoric uses of language are a sui 
generis type of guidance (ST 122-3). A speaker’s knowledge steers 
his grasp of utterances (ST 65, 171, 172). Appearances and sense 
impressions steer behaviour, bodily movements and goals and do this 
either immediately or immediately19. What psychologists call a set 
(Einstellung) is to be understood in terms of possible steerings.20 
This “wealth” of ways of guiding and and of goals, Bühler says, 
is often overlooked. The “structural monism” of the Berlin Gestalt 
                                                            
18 Bühler 1930 137, my emphasis - KM 
 
19 Bühler 1929 73-7, 80. 
20 Bühler 1929 121 
psychologists, for example, cannot do justice to the variety of 
guidance21, unlike the Vienna Gestalt psychologists.    
 The wealth and variety of signals and guidance corresponds to a 
variety of different types of understanding. “By nature, understanding 
comes in at least three kinds, in linguistic inquiry“ (ST 13, my 
emphasis - KM). To the difference between symbols, signals and 
expression there correspond three types of understanding, the 
understanding of symbols, of signals and of expression, three “keys to 
understanding”, he calls them, expression-keys, signal-keys, symbol-
keys (Ausdrucksschlüssel, Signalschlüssel, Symbolschlüssel (ST 13). 
There are, he repeatedly asserts, different levels, strata and depths of 
understanding..22 
Already in 1909 Bühler notes that “understand” and “sense of 
speech (einer Rede)”, which he calls “corresponding expressions“, are 
“not univocal” and refer to the “ambiguity of the concept of 
understanding”23. One of the reasons why it is so difficult to 
understand understanding is that “in understanding, we complete a 
great deal, specify much that is indeterminate”.24 
 
 Yet another type of understanding is pictorial understanding. 
Bühler agrees with Wittgenstein that “there is understanding and 
failure to understand” pictures and drawings, “understanding“ a 
picture may mean “various kinds of thing”; one example Wittgenstein 
gives is: 
 
                                                            
21 Bühler 1926, 1929 121-2. 
22 Bühler 1926 495, 507, cf. 474; Bühler 1929 85, 135, Bühler 1930 
225; on understanding, cf. Bühler 1929124, 133, 135; 1930 225, 406. 
23 Bühler 1909 104, 109. 
24 Bühler 1909 119. 
A picture is perhaps a still-life; but I don't understand one part of 
it: I cannot see solid objects there, but only patches of colour 
(Farbflecke) on the canvas25  
 
Reading off colour contrasts between colour patches in a physical 
field or context, says Bühler, is one thing. Taking in the pictorial 
values in the context of a painting a quite different thing: 
 
Colour contrast….is a phenomenon that can be read off from the 
symphysical field of the coloured patches (Farbflecken). The 
case of the 'context' of the pictorial values in a painting as a 
whole, however, is substantially different. If a painter mixes the 
same grey on his palette three times and three times places 
physically the same patch of grey in a developing picture, this 
patch can three times (or more often) receive a different pictorial 
value in the context of the painting; for example, it can give the 
impression of being a shadow or a light reflection or the colour 
of an object (Gegenstandsfarbe) (for example a spot of dirt on a 
white table cloth) — quite regularly and automatically for the 
viewer who is in a normal state of readiness to receive. The 
structural law of the pictorial values of a painting is completely 
different from colour contrast; these pictorial values are in a 
synsemantic field and receive certain field values in it. The 
patches of colour (in general: the sense data) must be assigned a 
sign (ST 165-6). 
 
§3 Misleading Pictures & Pianolas: Machines & Modality, 
Rules & Rigidity 
 
                                                            
25 Wittgenstein 1968 §526. 
 
 For someone to be actually guided by something is one thing. 
For her to be such that she could be guided by it is another thing. 
Similarly, for a machine to be actually guided by something is one 
thing. For it to be such that it could be guided in this way is another 
thing. This analogy was of great interest to Bühler and Wittgenstein. 
Unlike Bühler, Wittgenstein thinks that when philosophers talk about 
modality in this way they often give in to the temptation to see 
possibilities, abilities and powers as states of the bearers of these 
possibilities. As we shall see, to see modalities in this way is to be in 
the grip of a misleading picture, indeed it is to be guided by and 
misled by a picture. This particular misleading picture of modality had 
been described in 1908 by Marty, the Swiss philosopher to whom 
Bühler owes several of the guiding principles of his theory and 
philosophy of language. From the point of view of Marty and 
Wittgenstein, what Bühler says about the possibilities open to 
machines looks like a good candidate for exemplifying the mistake of 
assimilating modalities to states. 
 In 1926 Bühler announces that he has borrowed the term 
Steuerung from the vocabulary of physics. There is control and 
steering not only of “dead systems” but also in “animal and human 
communities”. It is a concept which applies to both behaviour and 
experience. Properly understood, it promises to help us understand 
intentionality. Brentano’s pathbreaking discovery of intentionality was 
of “so to speak static”, point-like intentionality. But intentionality of 
this sort is a mere abstraction from dynamic intentionality, in which an 
individual experience is a control-lever.26 
 
Whoever constructs a machine equips it with “degrees of 
freedom” (Freiheitsgraden, Toleranzen). Indeed “there is no machine 
without such degrees of freedom”. And “what we find in the domain 
of technology, we may also assume to be realised and used in the 
                                                            
26 Bühler 1926 487, 479. 
domain of organic steering”.27 There is “no material machine with 
only fixed connections, that is without grades of freedom”.28  
 
Bühler is so pleased with his distinction between the rigid or 
fixed connections and degrees of freedom of machines and organisms 
that he applies it to natural language and to a number of different 
linguistic phenomena. “Intersubjective communication with the signs 
of natural language is exceptionally imperfect in conforming to the 
requirement" of  
 
meaning constancy: the same word - the same meaning, 
wherever it is used. But the author of this book...finds that the  
 rigidity of a stiff riding boot may well have advantages, for  
 example for the horse rider; for the speakers of the clear  
 language of science are proud riders who insist on rigid,  
 well-defined word-meanings. However, there are other  
 advantages for intersubjective communication that are  
 provided by a certain plasticity of the meaning spheres  
of our naming words. Modern technology knows that one can 
and  must work with degrees of freedom in mechanical 
engineering; organisms have known this much longer. As in very 
complicated modern machines and the organs of organisms, 
there are safety  devices to correct the degrees of freedom of the 
meaning spheres of our naming words. Supersummativity and  
 subsummativity of attributive complexes increase the  
 productivity of language to a remarkable extent and make  
 possible laconic naming. This presupposes, of course, that a  
 correction of the indeterminateness and equivocity of the  
 complexes formed in this way is available for use (ST 350)  
 
                                                            
27 Bühler 1926 496-7. 
28 Bühler 1926 504-5 
 
 
It is in his working out of the ideas in this passage29 that Bühler 
anticipates contemporary, strongly contextualist accounts of meaning, 
accounts which Wittgenstein, too, is held to have anticipated. 
 
Are the possibilities open to machines and the abilities of 
humans states thereof? Wittgenstein notes in Brown Book cases where 
someone is actually guided by something only if she also has certain 
abilities: 
 
B is guided by the particular combination of words in one of our 
three sentences if he could also have carried out orders 
consisting in other combinations of dots and dashes. And if we 
say this, it seems to us that the 'ability' to carry out other orders 
is a particular state of the person carrying out the orders... And at 
the same time we can't in this case find anything which we 
should call such a state30. 
What is true of the way we speak about abilities is, Wittgenstein 
thinks, also true of the way we talk about de re possibility in general: 
There are…various reasons which incline us to look at the fact of 
something being possible,…as the fact that he or it is in a 
particular state. Roughly speaking, this comes to saying that “A 
is in the state of being able to do something” is the form of 
representation we are most strongly tempted to adopt;…31  
This is just the error Marty denounces in 1908, 
 the common perpetration of the fiction which consists in 
bringing what is not real…, in thoughts about it, far too close 
(heranrücken) to the real….Forces,…all possibilities…are 
                                                            
29 Cf. Mulligan 2012 ch. VI, Mulligan 1997. 
30 Wittgenstein 1972 117.  
31 Wittgenstein 1972 117. The “form of representation” mentioned here 
is an example of the phenomenon of the so called subjective apriori, 
as Scheler calls it, mentioned at the beginning of §1 above. 
treated as things, which have effects and are effected….And one 
proceeds in the same way in a thousand other cases.32  
As Wittgenstein puts the point, 
 We say: “It isn't moving yet, but it already has the possibility of 
moving”——‘so possibility is something very near reality’33 
He is here referring to a machine:  
 
We use a machine, or the picture of a machine, as a symbol for 
the particular action of a machine.… "The machine's action 
seems to be in it from the start" means: we are inclined to 
compare the future movements of the machine in their 
definiteness to objects which are already lying in a drawer 
and which we then take out34 
 
When we consider whether someone is guided by certain signs, there 
is an inclination 
 
to say some such thing as that we could only decide this question 
with certainty if we could look into the actual mechanism 
connecting seeing the signs with acting according to them.  For 
we have a definite picture of what in a mechanism we should 
call certain parts being guided by others.  In fact, the mechanism 
which immediately suggests itself… is a mechanism of the type 
of a pianola.  Here, in the working of the pianola we have a clear 
case of certain actions, those of the hammers of the piano, being 
guided by the pattern of the holes in the pianola roll.35 
                                                            
32 Marty 1976 354.   
33 Wittgenstein 1968 §194. On the misleading pictures and associated 
temptations denounced by Marty and Wittgenstein and their views of 
such pictures and temptations, cf. Mulligan 2019. 
34 Wittgenstein 1968 §193. 
 
35 Wittgenstein 1972 118. 
 
Wittgenstein also distinguishes between what Bühler had called rigid 
or fixed connections and degrees of freedom: 
 
The machine as symbolizing its action:.. We talk as if these parts 
could only move in this way, as if they could not do anything 
else. How is this—do we forget the possibility of their bending, 
breaking off, melting, and so on? Yes; in many cases we don't 
think of that at all. We use a machine, or the drawing of a 
machine, to symbolize a particular action of the machine. For 
instance, we give someone such a drawing and assume that he 
will derive the movement of the parts from it…36 
 
But “when we are concerned with predicting the actual behaviour of a 
machine 
 
we do not in general forget the possibility of a distortion 
of the parts and so on. - We do talk like that, however, when 
we are wondering at the way we can use a machine to symbolize 
a given way of moving—since it can also move in quite different 
ways.37 
 
Hintikka once claimed that Wittgenstein was interested in a problem 
which is common to both our following rules and to a machine’s being 
guided:  
…Wittgenstein’s problem about rules…has nothing to do with 
intentionality. Wittgenstein could have raised the same problem 
about machines instead of humans – and, in fact, did so. How is a 
machine guided by its blueprint? This question is parallel with the 
question: How does a rule guide my actions when I follow it? 
…Wittgenstein discusses how the motions of a machine are 
                                                            
36 Wittgenstein 1968 §193. 
37 Wittgenstein 1968 §193 
“guided” by its blueprint in Philosophical Investigations I, secs. 
193-194 among other places.38 
Whatever we should think about Hintikka’s account of Wittgenstein’s 
problem about rules, it seems clear that Bühler thought that the 
understanding of machines and language had much in common: 
 
My impression is that what is commonly called the 
“understanding” of a machine is a many-sided and in certain 
circumstances very complicated matter…The understanding of 
language is no different.39  
 
 
§4 Early Bühler & Early Wittgenstein on Rule-Awareness 
 
 The views about mind, language and colours criticised by “the 
later” Wittgenstein are often views which are not to be found in the 
writings of Frege, Russell and Moore or in the philosophical tradition, 
but rather in the writings of Brentano’s heirs.40 Occasionally, 
Wittgenstein tells us that a view he is criticising is a view he once 
held. Thus he says 
[e]arlier I thought at one time that grammatical rules are an 
explanation of what I experience on one occasion when I use the 
word. They are as it were consequences or expressions of the 
properties which I momentarily experience when I understand 
the word.41  
Is this view to be found in the Brentanian tradition? 
                                                            
38 Hintikka [undated]. 
39 Bühler 1929 135. 
40 Cf. Mulligan 2012. 
41 Wittgenstein MS 116, quoted by Hintikka [undated]. 
 In 1908, Bühler put forward the account of thinking he had 
arrived at as a member of the already mentioned Würzburg School, an 
account in which certain types of experience are said to be “direct 
expressions of rules” 
When we want to express a difficult thought we first choose a 
sentence form for it, we first become internally aware of the 
operational plan, and it is then this plan that marshals the words. 
When we understand a complex compound sentence we gain a 
knowledge of its grammatical structure, we know of the relations 
between the individual parts of the entire form. That also 
happens when we speak; when, for example, we begin a 
parenthesis with 'when' and suddenly break off at the end of the 
subordinate clause, we become conscious of the fact that we had 
expected something; what we expect is not only a completion 
with regard to the topic, but a grammatical completion: we 
expect a main clause. What we become specially aware of in all 
of these cases is what always or almost always mediates between 
thoughts and words, incidentally and without being particularly 
noticed: a knowledge of the sentence form and of the 
relationship of the parts of the sentence to each other, something 
that must be regarded as a direct expression of the grammatical 
rules that are active in us.42 
 
Bühler continued to endorse his 1908 account of a type of awareness 
which is a direct expression of rules active in us. He quotes 
approvingly the passage from his 1908 article quoted above in 1934 
(ST 254) 
 
As already mentioned, some of the claims of the Würzburg 
psychologists derive from reflection on Husserl’s Logical 
Investigations. This is true of Bühler’s account of rule-awareness, 
                                                            
42 Buhler 1908 84ff., emphasis mine – KM. On the use and 
understanding of Darstellung (representation), Symbol and Zuordnung 
(correlation) in early Bühler and early Wittgenstein, cf Mulligan 2012 
ch. V. 
which he presents as a modification of Husserl’s account of so called 
categorial intuition: 
 
What is an awareness of rules (Regelbewusstsein)? A thought in 
which something that from a logical point of view we call a rule 
dawns on us. But this is not an unambiguous description. I can 
also simply mean (meinen) a rule as I can any other object. 
Awareness of rules is not this thinking of a rule (an eine Regel 
denken) but rather thinking a rule or thinking in a rule (denken 
einer Regel oder in einer Regel). The object of rule- awareness is 
not the rule but the state of affairs or objective it refers to, is 
applicable to, from which it is perhaps derived.43  
 
Bühler’s later views about the place of rules and conventions in 
his masterly “theory” of language are merely hinted at in various 
places.44 A much more thoroughly developed philosophy of linguistic 
rules is that given by Ahlman who, like Bühler, develops ideas of 
Marty. Like Marty, Bühler and Wittgenstein, Ahlman thinks of words 
as essentially tools or implements, a view roundly rejected by such 
heirs of Brentano as Husserl and Scheler. Like the early Bühler and 
Wittgenstein, Ahlman thinks there is an intuitive grasp of rules: 
 
Individuals normally have an intuitive awareness of the 
rules…More or less distinctly, more or less exactly they have in 
mind (vorschweben) the (ideal) content of these norms, which 
they try to realise in speaking and understanding; individuals 
judge each other’s linguistic activity and understanding of what 
is said from the viewpoint of these norms.45 
But is our most basic grasp of the rules we follow and infringe really 
to be understood in the ways suggested by Bühler, early Wittgenstein 
                                                            
43 Bühler 1907, 335, cf. 339 
 
44 Cf. for example Bühler1926 494. 
45 Ahlman 1926 9. 
 
and Ahlman? Two philosophers who came to the conclusion that this 
grasp must be non-cognitive are Scheler and then Wittgenstein46 
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